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The Legality of Homosexual Maniage
Two men recently petitioned the Minnesota Supreme Court to com-
pel the state to grant them a marriage license.1 The court rejected their
application for mandamus, and their appeal was subsequently dismissed
by the United States Supreme Court.2 But the claim was far from frivi-
lous. A credible case can be made for the contention that the denial of
marriage licenses to all homosexual couples violates the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 There are serious difficul-
1. Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. Sup. Cc., 1971), appeal
dismissed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3167 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1972). Petitioners had applied for a marriage
license under MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.01 (1969), which does not specify the sex of the
applicants:
Marriage, so far as its validity in law is concerned, is a civil contract, to which
the consent of the parties, capable in law of contracting, is essential. Lawful mar-
riage hereafter may be contracted only when a license has been obtained therefor
as provided by law and when such marriage is contracted in the presence of two
witnesses and solemnized by one authorized, or whom the parties in good faith
believe to be authorized, so to do.
The clerk of the court declined to issue the license on the sole ground that petitioners
were of the same sex.
2. Baker v. Nelson, 41 U.S.L.W. 3167 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1972).
3. In addition to their Fourteenth Amendment argument, petitioners in Baker v.
Nelson also based their claim on a variety of other constitutional provisions, including
the First, Eighth, and Ninth Amendments. Although the arguments under thee pro-
visions raise some interesting legal issues, they probably cannot be sustained under
existing court precedent.
The First Amendment right to free speech and free assembly, as construed by the
Supreme Court, includes a number of other rights, among them the right to engage in
free and private associations. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 US. 23 (1968); Elfbrandt v. Russell,
384 US. 11 (1966); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539
(1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
Justice Douglas, writing for the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (196).
referred to the right of association as one of the "penumbras formed by emanations
from those guarantees [specified in the Bill of Rights] that help give them life and
substance." Id. at 484. Douglas' discussion of marriage is particularly significant:
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring and in-
timate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of
life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not
commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as
any involved in our prior decisions.
Id. at 486.
However, the Supreme Court has never specifically declared the marriage unit to be
an association within the terms of the First Amendment. Most right of association cases
to date have dealt with associations organized for political purposes, and moreover, with
existing associations rather than the formation of new ones.
Petitioners' Eighth Amendment claim was premised on the assertion that the denial
of their right to marriage constituted punishment for a status or condition which
they were powerless to change. They based their argument chiefly on the Supreme
Court's decision in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), in which the Court
struck down a state law under which a narcotics addict was sentenced to ninety days'
imprisonment on the ground that to condemn a person for "an illness, which may be
contracted innocently or involuntarily" constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Id.
at 667. But Robinson concerned punishment for a "crime"; even Justice Fortas' liberal
interpretation of Robinson, set forth in his dissent in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514,
567 (1968), does not extend the holding beyond the context of criminal sanctions.
Petitioners' Ninth Amendment claim was apparently based upon Justice Goldberg's
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ties with this equal protection analysis, which make it questionable
whether courts will uphold it under current precedent. Their claim,
however, would almost certainly be vindicated under the proposed
Equal Rights Amendment, which would establish a stricter prohibi-
tion against discriminatory treatment along sexual lines. This Note
will first examine the constitutionality of restricting marriage licenses
to heterosexual pairs under traditional equal protection doctrine, and
will then turn to the implications of the Equal Rights Amendment for
this practice.
I. The Fourteenth Amendment
It is by now well established that the Supreme Court varies the de-
gree of scrutiny to which it subjects legislative classifications according
to the groups and interests affected by any given classification. 4 The
so-called "strict scrutiny" standard is usually triggered by legislation
which either contains a classification that is suspect because of the
nature of the group disadvantaged, or threatens a "basic civil right of
man."5 When this standard is employed, the government is required
concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 488-97 (1965). justice
Goldberg there contended that the Ninth Amendment was inserted into the Bill of
Rights to protect from federal infringement certain fundamental rights not otherwise
mentioned (e.g., in Griswold, the right to marital privacy). He argued that at least
some of these fundamental rights, like some of the rights protected by the first eight
amendments, were made applicable to the states by the Due Process Clause of tile
Fourteenth Amendment.
With this interpretation in mind, it might be argued that the Ninth Amendment
shields the right to marry from governmental interference. Tangential support for
this contention could be derived from Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), in which
the Court held that the right to marry was fundamental and that denial of that right
on racial grounds violated the Due Process Clause. Id. at 12. However, It Is doubtful
that the Ninth Amendment significantly contributes to the resolution of this consti.
tutional problem. If the riaht to marry persons of the same sex is fundamental and
is not counterbalanced by important state interests, then an argument based on tile
Fourteenth Amendment, infra pp. 574-83, should carry Baker and McConnell's case.
If not, the Ninth Amendment case can hardly stand on its own.
4. See, e.g., Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Return of the
"Natural Law-Due Process Formula," 16 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 716, 739-46 (1969); Michelman,
Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HAv. L.
REv. 7 (1969); Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HArv. L. REV. 1065
(1969); Note, The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1, 60-71 (1970).
5. Every classification, other than racial, which has been found to be suspect by
the Court has been considered in the context of an important constitutional right.
In the cases in which wealth/poverty distinctions were overturned, the rights infringed
included voting (Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)), the right
to adequate appellate review (Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)), and the rlqht to
representation during such review (Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)). Carrington
v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965), in which the impermissible classification was between mili-
tary and civilian members of a community, dealt with the right to vote; Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), outlawing discrimination on the basis of residency for
welfare recipients, centered on the right to travel. Thus, while the inherently unfair
nature of a classification against a group is important and may be sufficient madc-
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to prove the presence of a "pressing public necessity" to justify such
classification.0
In actual practice, the Court has applied the full strict scrutiny
standard only rarely outside the context of racial discrimination.7 In
cases involving non-racial classifications, the Court's approach can
more realistically be viewed as a balancing process, perhaps best articu-
lated by Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinion in Dandridge v.
Williams:
In my view equal protection analysis of this case is not appreciably
advanced by the a priori definition of a "right," fundamental or
otherwise. Rather, concentration must be placed upon the charac-
ter of the classification in question, the relative importance to in-
dividuals in the class discriminated against of the governmental
benefits that they do not receive, and the asserted state interests
in support of the classification.8
There are thus three basic factors to be balanced: the degree to which
legislative classifications disfavoring homosexuals should be "suspect,"
because of legislative motivation; the importance of obtaining mar-
riage licenses to homosexuals as a class; and the interests of the govern-
ment in denying such licenses to all same-sex couples.
A. Suspect Classification
The Supreme Court has never explicated its grounds for declaring
certain classifications to be inherently suspect. However, examination
of the classifications thus far held to be suspect does reveal certain com-
mon denominators which may have motivated the Court in so desig-
nating them.
Judge J. Skelly Wright expressly articulated one relevant criterion
when he observed that classifications disfavoring "a politically voice-
pendently to render a classification suspect, see, e.g., McDonald v. Board of Election
Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969) (dicta), the nature of the right infringed by that
classification is often crucial in determining whether the Court will apply its stricter
standard. See Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HA.v. L. REV.
1065 (1969).
6. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
7. One such case is Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), in which the denial to
illegitimate children of the right to sue under a state wrongful death statute was held
unconstitutional. Other strict scrutiny cases, while superficially turning upon non.racial
classifications, have heavy racial overtones. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Board of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (poll tax requirement for voting found to discriminate
against the poor); Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (state
statute barring issuance of fishing licenses to persons "ineligible to citizenship" held to
violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court observed that the "Japanese are among
the few groups still not eligible." Id. at 412 n.1).
8. 387 U.S. 471, 520-21 (1970).
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less and invisible minority" should be subjected to "closer judicial sur-
veillance and review."9 Homosexuals as a group would appear to have
no more political influence than the black and poor minorities with
which Judge Wright was dealing.' 0
Classifications have also been found suspect when they are based on
attributes which are inherent in the individual and wholly, or largely,
beyond his control." Whatever the causes of homosexuality, the orien-
tation itself does not appear to be one that is freely chosen, nor in most
instances can it be changed.' 2 Groups which are the subjects of deroga-
tory myths of stereotypes are among those which have been accorded
the protection of the strict scrutiny standard, perhaps in part to insure
that such stereotypes do not become the bases for legislative classifica-
9. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 508 (D.D.C. 1967), remanded on other grounds
sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 402 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Judge Wright's comments,
made in the context of de facto school segregation, read in full:
Judicial deference to these [legislative and administrative] judgments is predicated
in the confidence courts have that they are just resolutions of conflicting interests.
This confidence is often misplaced when the vital interests of the poor and racial
minorities are involved. For these groups are not always assured of a full and fair
hearing through the ordinary political process, not so much because of the chance
of outright bias, but because of the abiding danger that the power structure-a
term which need carry no disparaging or abusive overtones-may incline to pay
little heed to even the deserving interests of a politically voiceless and invisible
minority. Those considerations impel a closer judicial surveillance and review of
administrative judgments adversely affecting racial minorities, and the poor, than
would otherwise be necessary.
Id. at 507-08.
While Judge Wright mentioned specifically only two groups-the poor and racial
minorities-shut out by the power structure, he did not preclude the existence of
others similarly disadvantaged. Professor Karst has explicated the decision in Williamson
v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955), in which a statute requiring opticians to re-
ceive written prescriptions from ophthalmologists or optometrists before duplicating or
replacing lenses was upheld, in terms that buttress this notion:
In Williamson, the losers in the legislature were not permanently disadvantaged
minorities. The opticians might well have anticipated new legislative alliances
that would soften the impact of this legislation by amendment.
Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Return of the "Natural Law
-Due Process Formula," 16 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 716, 724 (1969).
10. No publicly declared homosexual has been elected to any significant position
of power in the United States. In fact, hostility is manifest even to the expression of
views espousing civil liberties for homosexuals. See, e.g., the comments of Judge
Stevenson in McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193, 196 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1046 (1972).
11. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (classification dis-
favoring Japanese). See also Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (classification dis-
favoring illegitimate children); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1918)
(classification disfavoring persons "ineligible to citizenship").
While it is true that some classifications found to be suspect, such as poverty or military
status, are not wholly immutable or beyond the plaintiffs' control, they still represent
statuses which are not always freely chosen or easily discarded.
12. See I. BIEBER AND AssocIATES, HoMOSEXUALITY: A PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY 301, 310.19
(1962). For a recent discussion of the sociological and psychiatric debate centered on
the concept of homosexuality as a disease which can be cured, see A. KAPLEN, SEXUALITY
AND HONIOSEXUALITY 572-606 (1971).
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tion.13 Certainly disparaging misconceptions about homosexuals are
endemic in Western society.'
4
Perhaps most importantly, a history of discrimination, both public
and private, seems to characterize the groups granted this special judi-
cial status.' 5 Discrimination against homosexuals' G represents a cultural
theme in Western society which dates back to Biblical days.17 Such dis-
13. It is arguable that special fears born of racial prejudice encouraged the percep-
tion of Japanese-Americans as a potential threat during the Second World War. leading
to the internment camps and Korematsu, while Caucasians of German or Italian descent
were left relatively undisturbed. See Rostow, The Japanese-Asncrican Cases-A Disaster,
54 YALE L.J. 489, 496 (1945). Stereotypes also played a role in the controversy over the
poll tax, which was ruled unconstitutional in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elec-
tions, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), over the dissent of Justice Black-
The Court gives no reason at all to discredit the long-standing beliefs that making
the payment of a tax prerequisite to voting is an effective way of collecting revenue
and that people who pay their taxes are likely to have a far greater interest in
their government ....
Id. at 677. The Court majority, in finding suspect the wealth-poverty classification
in Harper, may well have been expressing its belief that the poor had suffered too
long from the "long-standing beliefs" mentioned by Justice Black.
14. See generally Taylor, Historical and Mythological Aspects of Homosexuality, in
SEXUAL INvEpsIoN 140-64 (J. Marmor ed. 1965). Common misconceptions abound; one is
that homosexuals are disposed to pedophilia, see M. SCHIOFIELD, SocioLoCicAL AsPEcrs
OF HOmOSExUALrrY 149 (1965); D. WESr, HOMOSEXUALTrrY 114-20 (1967), and sources
therein cited; another is that they predominate in certain social classes or professions,
see REPORT OF THE Co.MmrrrEE o- HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROsrrrUON 17 (1957)
[hereinafter cited as VOLFENDEN RP'ORT]; a third is that most male homosexuals are
effeminate, see M. HOFFMAN, THE GAY WoRLD 180-86 (1968), and that most female
homosexuals are over-masculine, see Martin & Lyon, The Realities of Lesbianism, in
TiE Niv Wo.mEN (J. Cooke, C. Bunch-Weeks & R. Morgan eds. 1970), 79-80.
15. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (state denial to Negro
citizens of right to serve on juries held to violate the Fourteenth Amendment):
This is one of a series of constitutional provisions having a common purpose;
namely, securing to a race recently emancipated, a race that through man), gen-
erations had been held in slavery, all the civil rights that the superior race enjoy.
Id. at 306.
16. One of the most serious areas of discrimination has been in the area of federal
employment. See generally Note, Dismissal of Homosexuals from Government Employ-
ment: The Developing Role of Due Process in Administrative Adjudications, 58 GEo.
L.J. 632 (1970); Note, Government-Created Employment Disabilities of the Homosexual,
82 HARv. L. REv. 1738 (1969); Note, Is Governmental Policy Affecting the Employment
of Homosexuals Rational., 48 N.C.L. REV. 912 (1970).
The Civil Service Commission, while tolerating other instances of "sexual misconduct"
such as adultery, once applied strict standards to homosexual behavior because of what
it perceived to be widespread public repugnance to homosexuality. See Note, Govern-
ment-Created Employment Disabilities of the Homosexual, supra, at 1741-43. Such
overt discrimination has since been modified as a result of Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d
1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969), in which the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that
there must be a specific connection between an employee's conduct and the efficiency
of the civil service before such an employee could be dismissed.
17. Early aversion to homosexuality is seen in the Torah. See Leviticus 18:22, 20:13.
The Talmudic law codes, relying on Biblical references, further elaborated the laws of
sodomy. See, e.g., MISHNAH, SANHEDRIN VII, 4.
These codes were transmitted to the Christian church by its early leaders, particularly
St. Paul. A. KiNSEY, AV. PotERoY, C. MARTiN & P. GEBItA., SExuAL BEHAvIOR iN TILE
HUMAN FEMALE 482 (1953). See generally D. BAiLEY, HomosExuALiTY AND TilE WESTERN
TiADrrto-. (1955). By the late Middle Ages, homosexuality was identified with heresy
and often punishable by death. Modern views have modified but not erased this hostile
attitude. See A. KAU.EN, supra note 12, at 1-39, 44-62, 66-81, 85-99; T. SzAsz, TiE M AN-
FACruRE OF MADNESS ch. 10 (1970); Taylor, supra note 14, passim.
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crimination arguably has been at least as burdensome as that which has
afflicted several of the minorities (including aliens and the poor) which
have been shielded on occasion by the stricter judicial standard of re-
view. However, the Court might reasonably find that discrimination
against homosexuals has not been as burdensome as that affecting other
minority groups, particularly blacks.
B. The Interests of Homosexuals
With respect to the second element in the balance-the importance
of marriage licenses to homosexuals-Court precedent is again of little
help. Even in the heterosexual context, the Supreme Court has never
specifically ruled that marriage, standing alone, is a sufficiently funda-
mental right to elicit use of the strict scrutiny standard. However, the
plausibility of such a holding is evident from a variety of cases. In the
context of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court has stated that the right to marry is "one of the vital personal
rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men ...
one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very exist-
ence.""' This fact was found to be crucial to the Court's conclusion
that anti-miscegenation statutes deprive interracial couples of due proc-
ess of law. 19 The Court's plurality opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut20
again stressed the fundamental nature of the marriage relationship,
noting that it draws special protection from a variety of constitutional
safeguards, including the right of association. 2' Most importantly, in
Skinner v. Oklahoma,22 the progenitor of strict scrutiny cases, the
Court held that the state's sterilization statute required use of that
more stringent standard in an equal protection context because of the
fundamentality of "[m]arriage and procreation."
2
However, even explicit judicial recognition of marriage as a funda-
mental interest to a heterosexual couple would not prove a fortiori that
homosexuals have interests of a comparable magnitude in being per-
18. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
19. Id. See also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), which stated in dicta that
marriage is part of that "liberty" protected by the Due Process clause because It Is
"essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Id. at 399. See also Boddle v.
Connecticut 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (due process forbids denial of access to divorce courts
because of inability to pay court fees and costs). The holding was based in part upon
"the basic position of the marriage relationship in this society's hierarchy of values,"
Id. at 374.
20. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
21. Id. at 486. See note 4 supra.
22. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
23. Id. at 541. See also United States v. Kras, 41 U.S.L.W. 4117, 4121 (U.S. Jan. 10,
1973) (dicta).
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mitted to obtain marriage licenses. Skinner is not alone among Su-
preme Court cases in linking marriage with procreation when consider-
ing the importance of those rights.2 4 It is unlikely, in light of Court
dicta25 and of the evolving attitudes toward marriage in our society,
that constitutional protections surrounding the institution of marriage
would be made dependent on the ability or willingness to bear chil-
dren.2 6 But it is still true that part of the importance of the marriage
license to heterosexual couples derives from the social acceptance and
legal protection which it guarantees for their natural childrep2 T Such
considerations would not apply to a same-sex pair.
On the other hand, state sanctioning of the marriage relationship
brings with it numerous other legal, social and even psychic benefits
which are of undiminished importance to homosexuals. Married indi- "
viduals enjoy substantial tax benefits,2 8 tort recovery for wrongful
24. Skinner states that the tw.'o rights together are "fundamental to the very ex-
istence of the race." 316 U.S. at 541. The Court implied a similar connection in Me)er
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923):
The liberty thus guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment] . . . denotes
freedom ... to marry, establish a home and bring up children.
25. See the characterization of marriage by Justice Douglas in Griswvold v. Connecticut,
881 U.S. 479, 486 (1965), set forth in note 4 supra.
26. The Minnesota Supreme Court in Baker itself recognized that any attempt by
the state to require such intent might be both unworkable and unconstitutional. 291
Minn. at 318-14, 191 N.W.2d at 187.
27. See, e.g., 1971 Midyear Reports and Recommendations of the Family Law Section
to the ABA House of Delegates on the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 5 FAmILY
L.Q. 133 (1971), and The Uniformn Marriage and Divorce Act, id. at 205. Note that
the present draft of the act provides for both maintenance and child support. Id. at
23335. The Baker courts reason for denying mandamus to the petitioners was that "[t]he
institution of marriage as a union of man and woman, uniquely involving the pro-
creation and rearing of children within a family, is as old as the book of Genesis."
291 Minn. at 312, 191 N.V.2d at 186.
28. Benefits available under the present federal income tax law, for example, in-
clude: Joint Returns. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6013(a) provides that "A husband and
wife may make a single return jointly of income taxes tinder subtitle A. e%en though
one of the spouses has neither gross income nor deductions . . . ." Sec id. at § I for
rate of tax. In addition to the general advantage of factoring two incomes of different
amounts into a single tax return, there are instances of joint returns being given other
preferential treatment: See, e.g., id. at § 179(b) (with regard to additional first year
depreciation allowance for small business, the ordinary limitation of $10,000 is raised
to $20,000 for husband and wife filing jointly); id. at § 1244 b) (with regard to losses
on small business stock, loss from the sale or exchange of an asset which is not a
capital asset shall not exceed $25,000 or $50,000 in case of husband and wife filing
joint returns); id. at § 121 (if taxpayer has attained age of 65, gross income does not
include gain from the sale or exchange of property). For husband and wife filing
a joint return, even though only one spouse satisfies the age requirement, both shall
be treated as satisfying it; id. at § 37(i) (2)(A) (similar provision for retirement income).
Deductions. Spouses are allowed deductions for each other as dependents in certain
instances. See LxT; R V. CODE OF 1954, § 214 (when incapacitated or institutionalized);
id. at § 218 (for medical expenses not compensated by insurance); id. at § 151 (generally,
$750 and an additioiial $750 if one is blind).
However, certain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code potentially disfavor mar-
ried people. See, e.g., INr. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1239(a) provides that the gain from the
sale of certain property between spouses is not considered a capital gain; id. at § 46(a)(4)
(with regard to computing credit for investment in certain depreciable property, married
individuals filing separate returns normally have only a $12,500 limitation per individual
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death, 29 intestate succession,30 and a host of other statutory and com-
mon law privileges.3' They also incur special liabilities, such as the
responsibility for support32 and maintenance3 3 during marriage and
for similar provision after divorce, 34 which may on balance be viewed
as beneficial by a couple regardless of sexual orientation. 0 Beyond
these strictly legal benefits, the formal status of marriage might reason-
ably be viewed as enhancing the stability, respectability, and emotional
depth of any relationship between two individuals, regardless of
whether the relationship is homosexual or heterosexual.30
C. The Interests of the Government
Against the interests of homosexuals and the suspect nature of
classifications disfavoring them must be placed the interests of the gov-
ernment in uniformly denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples.
One possible argument against any official attempt to normalize the
instead of $25,000); id. at § 48(c)(2)(B) (with regard to limitation on deductible cost of
used property there is a $25,000 ceiling for married persons filing separately instead of
the normal $50,000); id. at § 141 (standard deduction normally shall not exceed $2,000,
but for a married person filing separately, it shall not exceed $1,000). See also Richards,
Discrimination Against Married Couples under Present Income Tax Laws, 49 TAxEs 526
(1971); Richards, Single v. Married Income Tax Returns under the Tax Reform Act of
1969, 48 TAXEs 301 (1970).
29. Coliseum Motor Co. v. Hestor, 43 Wyo. 298, 305, 3 P.2d 105, 106 (1931).
30. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 46-12 (Supp. 1969).
31. Other benefits of legally sanctioned marriage include employee's family health
care, group insurance, and social security survivor's benefits. Automobile insurance pre-
miums are often lower for married people. See generally L. KANOWITZ, WO,MEN AND TilE
LAw 35-93 (1969); H. KYRK, THE FAMILY IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (19531); J. MADDEN,
THE LAW OF PERSONS AND DoMESTIC RELATIONS (1931). All benefits mentioned in this
section which distinguish unfairly on the basis of sex may be subject to the effects of
the Twenty-seventh Amendment if ratified. See p. 583 et seq. infra.
32. At common law and under various statutes the husband is bound to support his
wife. See, e.g., In Re Fawcett's Estate, 232 Cal. App. 2d 770, 777, 43 Cal. Rptr. 160, 165
(1965).
33. The husband is primarily liable for necessaries furnished to his wife. See, e.g.,
Cromwell v. Anderson Furniture Co., 195 A.2d 264, 265 (D.C. Ct. App. 1963). See also
Wanderer, Family Expense Legislation as Affecting Common Law Liability of Husband
for Necessaries, 68 COM. L.J. 36 (1963).
34. See, e.g., Rambo v. Rambo, 155 So. 2d 817 (Fla. App. 1963).
35. While some observers condemn the strictures of such laws, it cannot be denied
that they often act to preserve the marriage relationship or at least insure that its
break-up will follow an orderly pattern. See Reports and Recommendations on the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act and The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, supra
note 27.
36. See E. GRIFFITH, MARRIAGE AND THE UNCONSCIOUS 12 (1957); E. jAMES, MARRIAGE
AND SocmTY 204 (1952); A. MEARES, MARRIAGE AND PERSONALITY 7-8 (1958). See also New
Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 41 U.S.L.W. 1059 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1972),
in which the Court observed that nonceremonial marriages lack "the aura of permanence
that is concomitant with" ceremonial marriages and often do not provide "the stability
necessary for the instillment" of proper social norms. Id. at 1059. Since few clergies are
presently willing to marry a same-sex couple, the state's refusal to grant marriage li-
censes to such couples effectively deprives most of them of either a religious or a
secular marriage ceremony.
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homosexual relationship is that the government's approach toward
homosexuality should be one of treatment and rehabilitation rather
than tolerance and legalization. However, the implied assumption that
most homosexuals can be "cured" is now widely questioned.37
Another possible state interest lies in preventing an increase in the
incidence of homosexuality among adolescents. However, it is highly
questionable whether anyone can freely select his sexual orientation
on the basis of comparative legal advantages.38 Moreover, those coun-
tries which have legalized homosexual activity between consenting
adults have recorded no perceptible increase in the incidence of homo-
sexuality since such legalization."
Perhaps the most telling argument which the state might raise to
justify the denial of marriage licenses to homosexual couples is that
issuance of such licenses would run counter to the existing laws in
many states against homosexual acts. 40 It is undoubtedly true that the
legalization of homosexual marriage would put the states in the anoma-
lous position of officially sanctioning a relationship which is very likely
to encourage the commission of illegal sex acts. However, it should be
noted that such statutes-forbidding specified sexual activities between
consenting adults in the privacy of their home-are very possibly un-
constitutional. 41 In any case, they are rarely enforced, even against
homosexuals.
42
37. See WoLFrNDN 'osRT, supra note 14, at 25-30. For a more recent examination
of this continuing controversy and a discussion of the literature. see A. KArLEN, supra
note 12, at 572-606. Even the most optimistic psychotherapists rarely put the "cure"
rate at above one-third of the willing patients. A. KAI.EN, supra note 12, at 572.
38. B.BER ND AssocsTAs, supra note 12, at 310-19.
39. H. HYDE, TiE LOVE TAT DARED NOT SPEAK Irs NAtE 269 (1970). Tim WOLFEN.DE
REPORT, supra note 14, at 24, noted that in Sweden where reforms of laws dealing with
homosexual acts had been instituted some time before, there had been no noticeable
increase in homosexual activity over a ten-year period. In fact, it has been suggested
that, to the extent that legalization may lessen some of the problems of homosexual
life and make for more stable, long-term relationships, the amount of homosexual
proselytizing of minors may well decrease in the wake of such reforms. See E. Scium,
CRmiEs rHOUT VicrTsS Ili (1965). For the same reason, a similar decrease might
follow the legalization of homosexual marriage.
40. A similar argument was accepted in New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization
v. Cahill, 41 U.S.L.W. 1059 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1972), in which the Court justified the re.
striction of "Aid to Families of the Working Poor" to ceremonially married couples
on the ground inter alia that the state has a proper and compelling interest in refusing
to subsidize a living unit that encourages the violation of laws against fornication and
adultery.
41. Such an argument might be based on the right to privacy as developed in such
cases as Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1959);
and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1955). See Note, Homosexuality and the
Law, 17 N.Y.L.F. 273, 295-96 (1971).
42. It is estimated that there are twenty convictions for every six million homo-
sexual acts. Fisher, The Sex Offender: Provisions for the Proposed New Maryland
Criminal Code: Should Private, Consenting Adult Homosexual Behavior Be Excluded!,
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A final state interest which should be mentioned is of a more theo-
retical nature. The vast majority of Americans view marriage to be
by definition a union of man and woman; a scarcely smaller number
see homosexuality as "unnatural" and morally reprehensible.4 3 The
easy answer to these propositions is that the Fourteenth Amendment
was passed for the express purpose of preventing the enforcement of
exclusionary classifications based upon deeply felt beliefs which are not
grounded on objective, rational distinctions. Not long before the
passage of that Amendment, thousands of Americans sincerely believed
that a voter was "by definition" a white, male, property owner, and
that interracial marriages were immoral. Despite this argument, how-
ever, society's basic institutional conceptions must inevitably carry
some weight in the balance of interests, even though they may not suf-
fice alone to justify the denial of concrete legal benefits to those whose
conceptions differ.
44
D. Interests in the Balance
In light of the difficulties with the equal protection analysis, it ap-
pears doubtful that classifications infringing upon homosexual mar-
riage will receive the penetrating scrutiny evidenced in cases dealing
with racial discrimination or with established fundamental interests
such as criminal justice and the vote. Discrimination against homo-
sexuals, while pervasive, has not involved the degree of government
complicity which was largely responsible for the development of the
strict scrutiny standard. Similarly, the interests of homosexuals in ob-
taining marriage licenses, while not inconsiderable, are not fully com-
parable to the corresponding interests of heterosexuals, which have not
yet themselves formally attained the status of a "fundamental right"
in the equal protection context.
However, even if strict scrutiny is not expressly applied to this issue,
30 MAD. L. REV. 91, 95 (1970). See generally Project: The Consenting Adult Homosexual
and the Law: An Empirical Study of Enforcement and Administration in Los Angeles
County, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 643, 689, 734-42 (1966).
43. As an indicator of this attitude, it should be noted that in most states, offenses
described in the sodomy statutes are characterized by such terms as "abominable,"
"detestable," or "unnatural." Cantor, Deviation and the criminal Law, 55 J. CRIM.
L.C. & P.S. 441, 446 (1964). See also note 17 supra.
44. A stronger position is taken in P. DEVLIN, TnE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 20
(1959); "[S]ociety is justified in taking the same steps to preserve its moral code as
it does to preserve its government and other essential institutions." For a critique of
this position, see H.L.A. Hart, Immorality and Treason, 62 LISTENER 163 (1959). The
Devlin-Hart controversy has been discussed extensively. See, e.g., Anastaplo, Law and
Morality: On Lord Devlin, Plato's Meno, and Jacob Klein, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 231;
Blackshield, The Hart-Devlin Controversy in 1965, 5 SYDNEY L. REV. 441 (1967); Dworkln,
Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE L.J. 986 (1966).
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the Court would not be justified in falling back upon the simple "ra-
tionality" test which it developed primarily for the protection of eco-
nomic interests. 45 Rather, in accordance with Justice Marshall's articu-
lation, the Court should balance the conflicting interests of the state
and homosexuals, taking into consideration the danger that legislative
classifications disfavoring homosexuals may in fact be based upon
prejudice and misinformation about the nature of that condition.
II. The Equal Rights Amendment
The Court's decision that the denial of marriage licenses to homo-
sexuals does not abridge existing equal protection law would not save
that practice from attack under the proposed Twenty-seventh Amend-
ment. The version of the Amendment which is now before the states
for ratification" declares, in relevant part, that "Equality of rights
under law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by
any State on account of sex." 4 7 The legislative history of the Amend-
ment clearly supports the interpretation that sex is to be an impermis-
sible legal classification, that rights are not to be abridged on the basis
of sex.48 A statute or administrative policy which permits a man to
marry a woman, subject to certain regulatory restrictions, but categori-
cally denies him the right to marry another man clearly entails a classi-
fication along sexual lines.
The possibility that such a classification would violate the Equal
Rights Amendment was raised during both the congressional hearings
and debates on that proposal.49 The Amendment's chief sponsor in the
45. For cases applying the rationality test, see Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253
U.S. 412 (1920); Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
46. The Equal Rights Amendment was passed by Congress on March 23. 1972. 118
CONG. Rac. H. 2423 (daily ed. March 23, 1972). Less than two hours after the Senate
acted, Hawaii became the first state to ratify the amendment. Congressional Quarterly
692 March 25, 1972. It will become effective two years after its ratification by a
minimum of thirty-eight states.
47. H.R.J. Res. 208, S.R.J. 8 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
The first attempt at an equal rights amendment was the 1923 version: "Men and
women shall have equal rights throughout the United States and in every place subject
to its jurisdiction. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation." H.R.J. Res. 75. 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1923).
48. See, e.g., 118 CoNG. REC. § 4561 (daily ed. March 22, 1972) (remarks of Senator
Stevenson, co-sponsor of the amendment):
There is but one principle involved . . . sex, by and of itself cannot be used as a
classification to deny or abridge any person of his or her equal rights under the law.
49. See 118 CONG. REc. § 4372 (daily ed. march 21, 1972) (remarks of Senator Ervin):
Now, Mr. President, the idea that this law would legalize sexual activities between
persons of the same sex or the marriage of persons of the same sex did not originate
with me. I do not know what effect the amendment will have on laws which make
homosexuality a crime or on laws which restrict the right of a man to marry
another man or the right of a woman to marry a woman or which restricts the
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Senate, Birch Bayh, rejected that interpretation, reasoning that a pro-
hibition against homosexual marriage would not constitute impermis-
sible discrimination so long as licenses were denied equally to both
male and female pairs.50 Senator Bayh's opinion should, of course, be
given considerable weight in determining the legislative intent in
phrasing and passing the Equal Rights Amendment.5 However, it can-
not be seen as controlling unless it is at least reasonably consistent with
established constitutional doctrine and the more general interpreta-
tion of the proposed Amendment as evidenced in the legislative history.
As Professor Paul Freund observed during the congressional debates,
the Bayh reasoning runs counter to the Supreme Court's handling of
the anti-miscegenation statutes under the Fourteenth Amendment. "
In Loving v. Virginia,5 3 the Court ruled that a marriage license can-
not be denied merely because the applicants are of different races. Such
a denial was deemed to be an impermissible racial classification, even
though it affected the races equally.
54
In light of the frequently asserted claim that the Equal Rights
Amendment was designed to prohibit sex discrimination to at least
right of a woman to marry a man. But there are some very knowledgeable persons
in the field of constitutional law . . . who take the position that if the equal
rights amendment becomes a law, it will invalidate laws prohibiting homosexuality
and laws which permit marriages between men and women.
See also 118 CONG. REC. § 4373 (daily ed. March 21, 1972) (remarks of Senator Ervin,
quoting the testimony of Professor Paul Freund before the Judiciary Committee during
hearings on the Amendment):
Indeed, if the law must be as undiscriminating concerning sex as it is toward
race, it would follow that laws outlawing wedlock between members of the same sex
would be as invalid as laws forbidding miscegenation. Whether the proponents of
the amendment shrink from these implications is not clear.
50. 118 CONG. REC. § 4389 (daily ed. March 21, 1972):
The equal rights amendment would not prohibit a State from saying that the in-
stitution of marriage would be prohibited to men partners. It would not prohibit
a State from saying the institution of marriage would be prohibited from two
women partners. All it says is that if a State legislature makes a judgment that It
is wrong for a man to marry a man, then it must say it is wrong for a woman
to marry a woman-or if a State says it is wrong for a woman to marry a woman,
then it must say that it is wrong for a man to marry a man.
Another of the Amendment's principal supporters, Professor Thomas Emerson of Yale
Law School, has also expressed his belief that the Equal Rights Amendment was not
intended to force the states to grant marriage licenses to homosexual couples and
would not be so construed by the courts. Letter on file with the Yale Law Journal.
51. It should be noted, however, that various legislators dispute the importance of
legislative history as a guide to interpretation of the Equal Rights Amendment. See, eg.",
Hearings on H.J. Res. 35, 208 Before Subconim. no. 4 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 75 (1971) (remarks of Representative Wiggins, para.
phrasing the position of Senator Ervin):
The Senator just made the point that the Court at some future time will look
at the words of the statute itself or the amendment itself and will not look to the
legislative history, one of the reasons being that the States are not ratifying legislative
history. They are ratifying the language itself.
52. See note 49 supra.
53. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
54. Id. at 8.
584
The Legality of Homosexual Marriage
the degree that the Fourteenth Amendment presently prohibits racial
discrimination, 55 Loving would appear to raise a strong presumption
that homosexual couples could not be uniformly denied marriage
licenses after ratification of the Twenty-seventh Amendment. That
presumption can only be overcome by a showing that homosexual
marriage falls within the scope of a particular countervailing interest
or outright exception to the Equal Rights Amendment which would
not have applied to the equal protection analysis in Loving. Such a
showing cannot be made.
It was the clear intent of Congress to forbid classifications along sex
lines regardless of the countervailing government interests which might
be raised to justify such classifications. The language of the Equal
Rights Amendment, which speaks of an "equality" that "shall not be
denied or abridged," is much less flexible than that of the Fourteenth
Amendment,O which has been held to permit the consideration of
countervailing interests. 57 Professor Emerson explained that the new
Amendment
means that differentiation on account of sex is totally precluded,
regardless of whether a legislature or administrative agency may
consider such a classification to be "reasonable," to be beneficial
rather than "invidious," or to be justified by "compelling rea-
sons."58
The legislative history supports this proposition that the new Amend-
ment represents an unqualified prohibition-an absolute guarantee.50
55. See, e.g., 118 CONG. R ec. § 4394 (daily ed. March 21, 1972) (remarks of Senator
Gurney) in which the Senator maintained that passage of the Amendment %as intended
to compensate for the fact that the Supreme Court in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971),
had failed to subject a sex classification to the strict scrutiny routinely afforded cla.i-
fications based on race.
56. Compare the language of the Equal Rights Amendment, p. 583 supra, with
the corresponding prohibition in the Fourteenth Amendment: "No State shall . . . deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Co. sT.
amend. XIV, § 1.
57. See authorities listed in note 4 supra.
58. Emerson, In Support of the Equal Rights Amendmenl, 6 HAP. Civ. RicGirs-Civ.
Lin. L. REv. 225, 231 (1971). Professor Freund has agreed that "the proposal evidently
contemplates no flexibility in construction but rather a rule of rigid equality." Hearings,
supra note 51, at 72, quoted by Senator Ervin.
59. The House Judiciary Committee Report on the proposed amendment contained
an additional section proposed by Congressman Wiggins. See p. 586 infra. Fourteen
members of the Committee recorded their views separately, supporting ite Amendment
but opposing the additional section. H.R. REP. No. 359, 92d Cong.. 2d Sess. 5 (1971).
This separate statement specifically cited Professor Emerson for the view that the
Amendment establishes "the fundamental proposition that sex shall not be a factor in
determining the legal rights of women or of men." Id. at 6. The House as a whole
evidently adopted this separate statement when it rejected the Wiggins addition. Fur-
thermore, the Senate Report on that body's version of the Equal Rights Amendment
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In order to forestall this construction, the House Judiciary Committee
recommended the following addition to the Amendment:
This article shall not impair the validity of any law of the United
States which exempts a person from compulsory military service or
any other law of the United States or of any State which reasonably
promotes the health and safety of the people. 00
The purpose of the addition was to make it clear "that Congress and
the State legislatures can take differences between the sexes into ac-
count in enacting laws which reasonably promote the health and safety
of the people."" The proposed addition was rejected in the House by
a vote of 87-265.62
While even an absolutist interpretation would not prevent the courts
from balancing the Equil Rights Amendment against other constitu-
tional provisions which conflict with its commands, 3 no such consid-
erations were raised in defense of the anti-miscegenation laws and none
would appear. td be relevant to homosexual marriage. In discussing the
Equal Rights Amendment, the only constitutional conflict envisioned
by the commentators and legislators concerned the right to privacy,04
and it can hardly be argued that the denial of a marriage license to a
same-sex couple would in any way serve the interest of the individual
in being protected from government intrusion into his private life.
The "absolute" prohibition contained in the Equal Rights Amend-
ment is subject to only one exception, or what Professor Emerson and
his associates have termed a "subsidiary principle": 06 the Amendment
"would not prohibit reasonable classifications based on [physical] char-
acteristics that are unique to one sex."0' 0 This exception was designed
to shield laws, such as many of those applying to pregnancy or sperm
donation, which affect only one sex but which cannot realistically be
stated that "the separate views of [the fourteen Committee members) in the Mouse
Report . . . state concisely and accurately the understanding of the Amendment .
S. REP. No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1972).
60. H.R. REP. No. 92-359, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1971).
61. Id. at 2.
62. 117 CONG. REc. § 9390 (daily ed. October 12, 1971).
63. See Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Con-
stitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 900 (1971). But sec 118
CONG. REC. § 4258 (daily ed. March 20, 1972), in which Senator Ervin claims that the
Equal Rights Amendment is "absolute in its terms" and is therefore not subject to
balancing against other constitutional provisions.
64. See Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, supra note 63, at 900; Hearings, supra
note 51, at 40 (statement of Representative Griffiths).
65. Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, supra note 63, at 893.
66. 118 CONG. REc. § 4585 (daily ed. March 22, 1972) (Senate Report, quoting H.R.
Rep. 92-359).
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said to "discriminate" against the other.67 It might be argued that
heterosexual intercourse and procreation are activities which, because
of the unique physical characteristics of men and women, may only be
performed by different-sex couples, that these activities are central to
the societal concept of marriage, and that the state can therefore restrict
the granting of marriage licenses to different-sex couples.
This reasoning, however, would import into the Equal Rights
Amendment precisely those traditional societal judgments that the
Amendment was designed to circumvent. For example, a law regulat-
ing the manner in which hospitals treat pregnant persons would not
ordinarily discriminate against men, because it deals directly and nar-
rowly with a unique physical characteristic which men do not possess.
However, a law which stated that persons subject to pregnancy may not
enlist in the armed services would probably be considered discrimina-
tory, because it deals not only with an objective physical characteristic
but also with overbroad societal judgments about the capabilities of
persons having that characteristic. 8
In order to guard against illegitimate use of the "unique physical
characteristics" principle, Professor Emerson and his associates have
developed a series of factors which should be weighed by a court in
determining the constitutionality of a physical characteristics classifica-
tion under the Equal Rights Amendment."" These factors, which are
not readily applicable to the peculiar circumstances presented by a ban
on homosexual marriage, can be restated in terms of two more general
tests: (1) are the physical characteristics upon which the classification
is based truly unique to the class being regulated, and (2) is the regu-
lation involved "closely, directly and narrowly confined to [those]
unique physical characteristic[s]. ..,?70
A statute restricting marriage licenses to heterosexuals would fail
both of these tests. While it is perfectly true that no one has the physi-
cal characteristics to accomplish either procreation or heterosexual in-
tercourse with a member of the same sex, it is equally true that many
individuals, perhaps because of age or illness, are incapable of engag-
ing in these activities with members of the opposite sex. Nor is there
67. Hearings, supra note 51. at 40 (statement of Representative Griffiths). See also
Bayh, The Need for the Equal Rights Amendment, 48 No'rE DAMEI LAwy, 80, 81 (192);
Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, supra note 63, at 893.
68. See Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, supra note 63, at 894-9G, in which the
authors come to a similar conclusion concerning the exclusion of women from govern-
meat employment because of the absenteeism which might result from their potential
to become pregnant.
69. Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, supra note 63, at 895-96.
70. Id. at 894.
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the necessary close relationship between these activities and the insti-
tution of legal marriage as it is now permitted. As shown above, the
ability or willingness to procreate is not a prerequisite of legal marriage
in this country,71 nor is the legality of an existing marriage in any way
affected by the decision of both partners to forego heterosexual inter-
course. More generally, the belief that two persons having the same
primary sexual characteristics cannot benefit from many of the emo-
tional, social and legal consequences of the legal status of marriage is
factually untrue; 72 the belief that they should not so benefit is a sub-
jective conclusion beyond the scope of the unique physical characteris-
tics principle.
With no relevant or countervailing interests to place against the rule
of "absolute" equality of treatment, the proposed Equal Rights Amend-
ment should be interpreted as prohibiting the uniform denial of mar-
riage licenses to same-sex couples. If such a denial were to be permitted,
it would have to be on the basis of an analysis which was consistent
with the strict interpretation described above, and in addition, as Pro-
fessor Emerson has pointed out, in matters as important as marriage
"the burden of persuasion is on those who would impose different
treatment on the basis of sex."17 3 In the case of laws prohibiting homo-
sexual marriage, such a burden cannot be carried.
III. Quasi-Marital Status-an Alternative Approach
Although private consensual homosexual activity might be legalized
in this country without creating many problems, as it was in Great
Britain, the expansion of marriage to encompass homosexual couples
would alter the nature of a fundamental institution as traditionally
conceived.
The Supreme Court may in the future decide that such alteration is
beyond its competence and therefore that marriage should be con-
fined to its present definition absent a positive move on the part of
individual state legislatures to broaden it.74 If such proves to be the
11. See p. 579 and note 26 supra.
72. See pp. 579-80 supra.
73. Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, supra note 63, at 893.
74. This was essentially the Court's approach to polygamy in Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878).
Whether that nineteenth century rulin; would be affirmed today is at least open
to question in light of the Loving decision. Mormons would appear to have a par-
ticularly strong argument against the Reynolds decision based on Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972) (Wisconsin's attempt to force Old Amish children to attend school
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case, particular legal benefits available only to married couples might
still be attacked on equal protection grounds under both the Four-
teenth and Twenty-seventh Amendments.
If the Court granted homosexuals some of these benefits-without
compelling states to grant marriage licenses-it might eventually create
in effect a "quasi-marital" status. State legislatures might explicitly
grant such a status, and specify the attendant rights. 5 For example,
benefits such as tax advantages, wrongful death rights and intestate
inheritance could be granted more easily to the homosexual couple
than could inclusion within the complete maintenance-divorce-alimony
complex of laws involving substantial state regulation. An analogy can
be drawn to the line of Supreme Court decisions which has given ille-
gitimate children certain rights, albeit a less-than-equal status in com-
parison to their legitimate siblings. T1
IV. Conclusion
In the final analysis, the Court should not avoid granting full relief
from discriminatory legislation simply because that legislation is based
on deeply held beliefs. A quasi-marital status might satisfy many of the
interests of homosexuals in gaining marriage licenses, but it would
inevitably fall short of fully normalizing their relationships. A legis-
lative stigma of deviance would remain. The stringent requirements
of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment argue strongly for removal
of this stigma by granting marriage licenses to homosexual couples who
satisfy reasonable and non-discriminatory qualifications.
through age sixteen held an unconstitutional infringement on freedom of religion), as
noted by Justice Douglas in dissent, id. at 247. See generally H. Foster, Marriage: A
"Basic Civil Right of Man," 37 FoRmDm L. REv. 51 (1968).
75. The possibility of such a legislatively created quasi.marital status for homo-
sexuals was suggested in J. GornsrEIN & J. KATz, TIlE FAMILY AND TiE LAw 9 n.1 (1955).
76. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971); Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability
Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
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